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A MODEL FOR ARBITRATION LAW:
AUTONOMY, COOPERATION AND
CURTAILMENT OF STATE POWER
Kenneth R. Davis*
Introduction
When I was five or six, my friend Sammy and I got into a disa-
greement over who had tied the superior knot with his shoelaces.
We asked our friend Harry to decide the issue. After inspecting
our handiwork, he noted that my knot had more sweeping loops,
but that Sammy's was more symmetrical - the judicious (and ap-
propriate) outcome: a tie. Satisfied that justice had been done, the
three of us trotted to the schoolyard to play stickball.
This was my first experience with arbitration. Sammy and I had
submitted our dispute to a non-judicial decision maker for binding
determination. Despite our disagreement, we had managed to
agree on a method to resolve the dispute. We had cooperated in
the face of controversy by exercising our rights to enter into an
arbitration agreement. Rather than submitting to rules imposed by
a higher authority (mom or dad), we had set our own ground rules
to attain justice, and, win or lose, we were willing to respect the
outcome.
Commentators praise arbitration for its economy.1 Compared to
cumbersome litigation, arbitration saves time and money.2 Arbi-
tration avoids the formalities that hobble litigation from service of
the pleadings through determination of the final appeal. Litigation
begins with the filing of a summons and complaint, which must sat-
isfy formal procedural requirements.3 Mired in interminable dis-
* Associate Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University, Gradu-
ate School of Business Administration. B.A., State University of New York at Bing-
hamton; M.A., University of California at Long Beach; J.D., University of Toledo
College of Law.
1. See generally 1 GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 1:01, at 2 (rev. ed. 1984); PHILIP J. HOBLIN JR., SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCE-
DURES STRATEGIES CASES §§ 2-4 to 2-5 (2d ed. 1992); COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
FOR THE 1990s 41-53 (Richard J. Medalie ed. 1991).
2. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, Making Securities Arbitration Work, 50 SMU L.
REV. 277, 278 (1996) (arguing that the speed and cost-effectiveness of arbitration will
diminish if the courts meddle in the arbitral process).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (filing of complaint); FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (general
notice pleading standard); FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (heightened pleading standard for mat-
ters such as fraud and breach of fiduciary duty).
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covery and contentious motion practice, lawsuits trudge along at a
frustrating pace toward trial, and even when the trial has con-
cluded, appeals may delay ultimate resolution for years.4 The time
consumed in a complex litigation may entail the expenditure of a
war chest. On the other hand, arbitration dispenses with formal
pleadings, massive discovery, aggressive motion practice, and end-
less appeals.' The process hurries to conclusion.
Although arbitration is undoubtedly more efficient than litiga-
tion, efficiency is only one advantage of arbitration. Arbitration
serves the fundamental values of cooperation, individual auton-
omy, and curtailment of governmental power. As the "shoelace"
anecdote suggests, arbitration uniquely promotes two seemingly in-
compatible values: individual autonomy and cooperation.6 While
embroiled in a dispute, two parties agree freely on how to attain
justice.7 At a time when they are least likely to cooperate, their
mutual desire for fairness, efficiency, and self-determination
prompts them to devise jointly a course to resolve their contro-
versy.' They provide the source of the power that will bind them:
4. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BuFF. L. REV. 49, 53-55 (1997) [hereinafter Judicial
Review] (describing the dilatory procedures that pervade litigation); Jethro K. Lieber-
man & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424, 427 (1986) (commenting that the discovery process may con-
sume years); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 9 (1984) (assailing the rampant use of discovery in stalling lawsuits); Jon 0.
Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J.
1643, 1644 (1985) (criticizing the overuse of depositions, which often yield little help-
ful information). But see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What
We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 61 (1983) (questioning the prevalence of
discovery abuse); David M. Trubek, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 72, 89-96 (1983) (defending the reasonableness of most discovery practice).
5. See generally Constantine N. Katsoris, An Arbitrator's Perspective, in SECURI-
TIES ARBITRATION 1998: REDEFINING PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES at 312-314, PLI
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series Ord. No. BO-001K (July-Aug.
1998) (commenting that "bloated" discovery lists "annoy the arbitrators" and that
arbitrators generally defer most motions until after hearing the case).
6. Immanuel Kant believed that justice requires the blending of autonomy and
cooperation. He said: "Justice is therefore the aggregate of those conditions under
which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance
with a universal law of freedom." IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
OF JUSTICE 34 (John Ladd trans. 1965).
' 7. This scenario assumes a post-dispute arbitration agreement. Pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements are perhaps even more prevalent than post-dispute arbitration
agreements.
8. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (com-
menting that "arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way
to resolve those disputes - but only those disputes - that the parties have agreed to
MODEL FOR ARBITRATION
they select an arbitrator and invest him with decisionmaking au-
thority.9 Although the "shoelace" example pertains to post-dispute
arbitration agreements, the same benefits flow from pre-dispute ar-
bitration agreements, where parties exercise their autonomy to es-
tablish jointly a mutually advantageous method for resolving future
disputes. Neither party relies on the power of the state to establish
the rules of dispute resolution or to compel the other party to ap-
pear at a forum under state control.
This Article argues that arbitration agreements uniquely mani-
fest individual autonomy and cooperation while limiting the reach
of state adjudicative power over civil disputes. The state should
therefore be prudent before refusing to limit arbitrability or entan-
gling itself in the arbitral process. The courts, however, have a sub-
stantial role in determining the enforceability of arbitration
agreements and reviewing awards. Judges should not enforce arbi-
tration agreements that are vulnerable to contract defenses such as
fraud, duress, or illegality. 10 They should, however, enforce all
other arbitration agreements. Once arbitration proceeds, the
state's only role should be to assure that the arbitrator effectuated
the contractual intent of the parties to the arbitration agreement.
If an arbitrator fails to follow the agreement, he has frustrated the
parties' expression of autonomy and cooperation, and the court,
when appropriately invoked, should intervene to achieve party in-
tent.'1 When arbitrators fail to apply chosen law correctly, judicial
review for errors of law may be required to meet the parties' con-
submit to arbitration"); Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New
York, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 132-33, 182 N.E.2d 85, 87, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403-04 (1962) (stat-
ing that arbitration is "a creature of contract, a contract in which the parties them-
selves charter a private tribunal for the resolution of their disputes"); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1984) (noting that
the contractual intent of the parties guides an international arbitral tribunal hearing
the dispute); Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration - A Preliminary In-
quiry, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 698, 699 (1952) (observing that arbitration entails
an agreement contemplating binding authority of a nonjudicial decisionmaker);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92
Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1997) ("Arbitration remains first and foremost a creature of
contract. Its shape and substance is formed by private agreement.").
9. The rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), for example,
provide that the arbitrating parties select the arbitrators. AAA RULES, RULE 13-15 &
54 (1998).
10. The FAA is consistent with this view, making arbitration agreements subject
to common law contract defenses. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
11. Parties complaining of arbitrator error may bring such issues to the attention
of the district court on a motion to vacate the award. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). Section 10
provides for vacatur:
(1) Where an award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
1999]
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tractual expectations.12 , The state should not tamper with arbitra-
tion beyond this point.
This approach maximizes individual autonomy and cooperation
while minimizing governmental interference. The state does not
interfere, however, when it facilitates the achievement of party in-
tent. As shown below, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
have failed to find the proper level of governmental intervention
into arbitration agreements. At first, the Court intruded into the
realm of "private government," by refusing to permit arbitration of
most federal claims. 3 Though conceding that arbitration was effi-
cient, the Court condemned arbitration for potential unfairness.
The last twenty years have ushered in a transformation in the
Court's attitude; condemnation has fallen to preference. 4 In its
enthusiasm for arbitration, the Court has set arbitrators free of
legal oversight, relinquishing even a modest commitment to safe-
guarding the contractual intent of the parties.'5
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
material and pertinent to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of a party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them so that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
Id.
12. See Davis, Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 123-29 (arguing that when parties
arbitrate a statutory claim or include a choice-of-law clause in their agreement, the
court, when properly invoked, must correct legal errors unless the arbitration agree-
ment expressly waives judicial review).
13. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (refusing to enforce pre-dispute agree-
ments to arbitrate claims arising under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933),
overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
14. See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1984) (stating that party intent to arbitrate is "generously construed"); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring the "national policy favoring arbi-
tration"); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (proclaiming the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," and
instructing that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration").
15. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995)
(weakening the FAA's commitment to party intent by announcing that "the FAA's
pro-arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting
parties"); (emphasis in original) Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching To-
ward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV.
1381, 1401 (1996) (recognizing that the Supreme Court, in advancing an over-expan-
sive view of the FAA, has abandoned fundamental principles of voluntary consent
when evaluating whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable).
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Part I offers a justification for the thesis of this Article. The jus-
tification derives from economic theory and political philosophy.
In Part II, the author uses the thesis of this Article to evaluate the
Federal Arbitration Act. In addition, Part II applies the thesis of
this Article to numerous issues that have dogged courts for de-
cades, if not centuries. First, the author evaluates the public policy
defense to arbitration, a doctrine now in disrepute, which, until the
1980s, foreclosed the arbitration of numerous federal statutory
claims. Next, the author analyzes state law restrictions that apply
specially to arbitration agreements. Third, the author discusses
whether courts or arbitrators should decide threshold issues of en-
forceability such as fraud and unconscionability. Finally, the au-
thor examines whether punitive damages should be a remedy
available to arbitrators. The Article concludes that arbitration pol-
icy should recognize, not only the value of autonomy and coopera-
tion as manifested in arbitration agreements, but also the role of
arbitration in curbing the scope of state power over civil disputes.
I. A Theoretical Rational
Government is too big. This complaint resonates from the
cornfields of Kansas to the financial markets of Wall Street. A reg-
ulatory web ensnares the business community. Taxes flatten our
wallets. The lathe of lawmaking cuts into our civil rights, however
theoretically inalienable those rights may be. All levels of govern-
ment come under criticism, but the growing colossus in Washington
has sparked unrelenting attack. Many in Congress, perhaps cyni-
cally, have joined in the self-deprecating call to limit the influence
of the national government.16 Bending to the public's disenchant-
ment with the federal behemoth, even President Clinton, a long-
time proponent of big government, advocated "government that is
smaller, lives within its means, and does more with less."
1 7
Far from a new phenomenon, distrust of expansive governmental
power has occupied political thought since the Enlightenment.18
16. See, e.g., Statement of Senator Grams, 144 CONG. REC. S10-01 (Jan. 27, 1998)
("I am a Republican, elected by the people of Minnesota to carry out my promise to
lower their taxes and reign in a federal government that has grown out of control.").
17. 33 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 60, Administration of Wil-
liam J. Clinton, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1997). President Clinton straddled the
fence between supporting expansive or contracted federal power when he stated that
"we have resolved for our time a great debate over the role of government. Today we
can declare: Government is not the problem, and government is not the solution. We
- the American people - are the solution." Id.
18. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of political
philosophers over expansive state power).
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John Locke believed that man's faculty for reason would reveal the
natural principle of equality between men.19 Yet he recognized the
tendency of some selfishly to pursue their own interests to the ex-
clusion of the interests of others. Observing that "[a]bsolute
monarchs are but men, ' 20 Locke cautioned against unlimited state
power, because he feared that sovereigns might exploit the gov-
erned and deprive them of their natural rights of liberty and prop-
erty.21 Even more emphatically, Thomas Jefferson denounced
excessive political power as the inevitable instrument of oppres-
sion.2 2 He suggested that the "generalizing and concentrating [of]
all cares and powers into one body" has "destroyed liberty and the
rights of man in every government that has existed under the
sun."23
19. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERN-
ING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, reprinted in
LOCKE'S Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 4-7, at 287-89 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
1967). See J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 11 (2d ed. 1973) (ex-
plaining Locke's belief that moral law exists in nature and that one may discover this
law through reason); A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKIAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 105
(1992) (discussing Locke's position that natural rights are subject to rational
deduction).
20. LOCKE, supra note 19, § 13, at 294. Locke stated:
Absolute monarchs are but Men, and if Government is to be the Remedy of
those Evils, which necessarily follow from Mens [sic] being Judges in their
own Cases, and the State of Nature is therefore not to be endured I desire
to know what kind of Government that is, and how much better it is than the
State of Nature, where one Man commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to
be Judge in his own Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever he pleases,
without the least liberty to any one to question or controle those who Exe-
cute his Pleasure?
Id.
See Karen Iverson Vaughn, The Economic Background to Locke's Two Treatises
142, appearing in JOHN LOCKE'S Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Edward J. Harp-
ham ed., 1992) (commenting that Locke viewed all men, including sovereigns, as mo-
tivated by self-interest and prone to abuse untempered political power). Thomas
Hobbes argued that man's natural selfishness impels those who desire the same things
to seek the subjugation and destruction of competitors. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIA-
THAN 87 (Richard Tuck ed. 1996) (1651). To remove themselves from perpetual war-
fare, men institute governments, which, if justly administered, stave off conflict and
protect the rights of individuals by punishing offenders. See id. at 117.
21. LOCKE, supra note 19, § 13, at 294. Locke posited that pre-political man ex-
isted in a state of nature in which he enjoyed a perfect state of freedom. This freedom
encompassed liberty and property rights. Id. § 4, at 287.
22. See LANCE BANNING, JEFFERSON AND MADISON 226 (1995) (quoting a letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, February 2, 1816).
23. Id.
MODEL FOR ARBITRATION
Economists, too, deplore a state bloated with power.24 Milton
Friedman argues that when the state controls the economy it be-
comes uncontrollable and dangerous .2  A free market economy,
says Friedman, deters the acquisition of unbridled state power.2 6
He explains that "[b]y relying primarily on voluntary co-operation
and private enterprise, in both economic and other activities, we
can insure that the private sector is a check on the powers of the
governmental sector. ' '2 7 In this statement, Friedman identifies two
forces that contain governmental expansion: cooperation and pri-
vate enterprise, which together comprise the expression of individ-
ual autonomy in the market setting.
Contract is the tool that enables market participants to carve out
spheres of private control. 28 An expression of autonomy, a con-
tract represents the cooperation of two people with competing but
compatible goals. It is the instrument that hinders the expansion of
government into private affairs. Contracting parties agree on
terms that will bind them. These terms - whether relating to
price, delivery, breach, or dispute resolution - establish the self-
imposed rules of the transaction. The contract provides the "law"
governing the economic relationship.2 9 Private law, the law of con-
senting, cooperating parties, displaces public law.
24. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing economic concerns of
expansive state power).
25. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 4 (1962).
26. See id. at 2.
27. Id. at 3. Friedman argues that to protect freedom "the scope of government
must be limited." Id. at 2. Friedman believes that capitalism is a necessary pre-condi-
tion for freedom, but that capitalism is not a sufficient pre-condition to insure free-
dom. ,See id. at 10. He observes, for example, that the most oppressive totalitarian
regimes in the twentieth century operated under a free market economy. See id.
Robert Nozick argues that only a "minimal state" is justifiable. ROBERT NozICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 297 (1968). He advocates a state that functions like a
"night watchman" whose only purpose is to protect one person from harming an-
other. Id. at 26. See also ALLEN BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY AND THE MARKET
64-65 (1985) (summarizing Nozick's thesis that any governmental curtailment of indi-
vidual rights is undesirable). Kurt Rothschild criticizes Nozick's libertarianism, noting
that markets require regulation in such areas as drug trafficking, minimum wage, and
indentured servitude. See KURT W. ROTHSCHILD, ETHICS AND ECONOMIC THEORY
43-49 (1993).
28. See W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES 9-11 (1996) (noting that before
the eighteenth century a court would set a contract price if a party complained that a
tradesman had overcharged, but that since that time freedom of contract has sup-
planted state control over contractual terms and relationships).
29. See Manfred Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L.
REV. 941, 942 (1971) (commenting that under classical contract law "the legal situa-
tion of the individual ... is determined by his efficiency and capabilities in a capitalis-
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Borrowed from economics and political philosophy, the argu-
ment against excessive state power presents compelling support for
arbitration. Arbitration agreements result from the cooperation of
two quarreling parties who desire a fair and efficient method of
dispute resolution.3" Spawned by private enterprise, such agree-
ments express individual autonomy, the exercise of the right to
contract. 31 The result of the cooperative exercise of individual con-
tract rights is self-government. Frances Kellor, a scholar of arbitra-
tion, recognized this point when she commended those who agree
to arbitrate because they have exercised "freedom, self-discipline,
and self-regulation. ' 32  An advocate of arbitration, Kellor called
"self-regulation" a natural right in a democratic society.33 Such
agreements, however, do not merely represent the cooperative ex-
ercise of free market contract rights of two contestants to a dispute.
They are unique in mapping out spheres of private government
usually reserved to the state: arbitration divests the government of
civil adjudicative power.34 Other approaches to dispute resolution
tic economy, an economic order that places the institution of contract at his disposal
as the instrument of free and responsible determination of legal relations").
30. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,
433 (1988) (remarking that, because arbitration is contractual, the parties can design
the process to fit their needs).
31. See Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Ap-
proach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1070 (1987) (arguing
that contract rights grow out of personal autonomy, which pre-dates the state). Since
arbitration agreements are an expression of autonomy, Morgan reasons that claims
entailing purely private conflicts should be arbitrable, since the agreement to arbitrate
such disputes is an expression of natural rights. Claims arising from rights created by
the state to benefit the public, as a matter of public policy, should not be arbitrable,
since such claims do not arise from man's natural autonomy, but rather are artifacts of
the state. See id.
32. FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 6 (1948).
33. Id. at 4. Though recognizing that the lack of arbitration organizations in early
American history discouraged the use of arbitration, Kellor wonders nevertheless
how a people so committed to freedom and self-regulation neglected arbitration until
the twentieth century when it came into vogue. See id. at 5-6.
34. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981) (holding an arbitra-
tion clause unenforceable because the arbitral forum appeared biased); Parson v. Am-
bros, 121 Ga. 98 (1904) (warning that "[b]y first making the arbitration contract, and
then declaring who should construe it, the strong could oppress the weak"). See gen-
erally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 61 (1992) (surmising that
some courts spurned arbitration agreements fearing that the powerful might force
their weaker adversaries into arbitration, and then they might control the process of
selecting arbitrators and improperly affect the outcome). See also Paul L. Sayre, De-
velopment of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 611 (1928) (Before the
Twentieth century, English courts resisted enforcing arbitration agreements because
"one of the parties [might have been] able to dictate almost his own terms to the
other. The other party might well [have been] forced into an arrangement for arbitra-
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such as negotiation, conciliation,35 settlement, and mediation36 may
avert litigation, but none of these replaces the courthouse with a
tribunal created by contract and tailored to the needs of the par-
ties.37 None confers binding authority on a person who has no con-
nection to the state and who, to a significant extent, is free of the
legal strictures - procedural, evidentiary, and substantive - that
the state imposes on litigants. 38 Every year, parties remove hun-
dreds of thousands of disputes from the courtroom to an arbitral
forum.39 State and federal power diminish when civil adjudication
shifts from the public sector to the private sector.
tion which would [have been] inadequate to protect his rights."). Cf. Woodyard v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 760, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
(declining to enforce an arbitration clause in a standard securities customer account
agreement because the broker lulled the unsophisticated investor into acquiescence).
But cf., e.g., Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1465
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (enforcing mandatory arbitration clause between broker and
employee).
35. Conciliation is akin to mediation. The term is often used in the context of
labor disputes where a neutral third party assists the parties to settle the dispute and
avoid arbitration. See 1 WILNER, supra note 1, § 1:02, at 4-5 (observing that most
commercial arbitrators do not seek to facilitate settlement).
36. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2:01, at 1 (rev. ed.
1998) (explaining that "[m]ediation is a nonbinding process where a neutral assists the
parties in reaching a settlement but has no authority to make a final and binding
decision or award").
37. The parties to an arbitration agreement can fashion the process to suit their
goals. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989) (noting that "parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agree-
ments as they see fit"); BERTOLD H. HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HAND-
BOOK § 1.07, at 1-11 (rev. ed. 1991) (instructing that "the possibilities for custom
tailoring [arbitration agreements] are almost endless"); Stipanowich, supra note 30, at
433 (stating that the parties can mold the arbitral process into the form they desire).
38. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing the informality of
arbitration).
39. The AAA, a public service organization offering a wide range of dispute reso-
lution options, is the most popular arbitral forum. See OEHMKE, supra note 36,
§ 20:01, at 1. The number of filings at the AAA in 1995 was 62,423. Telephone Inter-
view with Barbara Brady, Director of Case Administration AAA (Aug. 26, 1996).
AAA filings climbed to 72,200 in 1996. Telephone Interview with Luis Cruz, Assis-
tant to Director of Case Administration AAA (Feb. 27, 1997). See also OEHMKE,
supra note 36, § 20:01, at 1 ("While the majority of arbitration[s] ... are administered
by the [AAA], special tribunals exist, particularly those serving licensed profes-
sions."). Securities self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") such as the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange administer thousands
of securities arbitrations annually. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First
Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 491 (1996) (reporting that between 1979
and 1996 a total of over 65,000 cases were filed with SROs); SEC. IND. CONF. ON ARB.
38 (10th Rep. July 1998) (reporting that in 1997 SROs received a total of 6,665 arbi-
tration cases).
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Some argue, however, that judicial power belongs under state
control.40 Heinrich Kronstein disdains arbitration for usurping ju-
dicial power from the state.4' Because arbitrators are not bound by
law,42 or at least they believe themselves not to be bound, Kron-
stein brands arbitration a "lawless" form of "private government."
This failure to enforce the law, Kronstein argues, does not merely
inflict injustice on the disputing parties, but also injures society.
When law is not enforced, society suffers because legal norms
erode. Legal norms need exercise like muscles, and they will atro-
phy from disuse. Judge Harry Edwards has expressed similar mis-
givings about arbitration, warning that arbitration may "endanger
what the law has accomplished[,]" for arbitration replaces "the rule
of law with nonlegal values."43 Owen Fiss, too, criticizes alterna-
tive dispute resolution (which subsumes arbitration) for depriving
courts of the opportunity to clarify and develop the law. He con-
tends that arbitration frustrates the judges' role to "explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring
reality into accord with them. 44
These scholars exaggerate when they link arbitration to the dis-
solution of values.45 True, the evolution of common law is indis-
pensable to our legal system. Contract law and tort law reflect the
accumulation of centuries of judicial wisdom. Judicial decisions
40. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987) (warning that "the legal norms that ADR ignores
regularly could atrophy and become inefficacious").
41. See Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration - Instrument of Private Govern-
ment, 54 YALE L.J. 36 (1944).
42. See, e.g., Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986) (stating that "the arbitration system is an
inferior system of justice, structured without due process, rules of evidence, accounta-
bility of judgment [or] rules of law"); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products,
Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 626, 237 N.E.2d 223, 225, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1968) (stating
that "[a]rbitrators are not bound by rules of law"); 1 WILNER, supra note 1, § 25:01, at
391 (noting that "arbitrators need not follow otherwise applicable law when deciding
issues before them unless they are commanded to do so by the terms of the arbitra-
tion agreement" (quoting University of Alaska v. Modern Const., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132,
1140 (Alaska 1974))); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 81, 85 (1992) (recognizing that prevailing law permits arbitrators to ignore
legal doctrine).
43. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668, 676-77 (1986). Judge Edwards cites the example of arbitrating
disputes involving toxic waste. The arbitral award may contradict public law and may
injure society by allowing dangerous practices to continue. See id. at 677.
44. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
45. See Davis, Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 83-85 (arguing that legal norms
flourish even when the majority of disputes never reaches the courts).
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scrape muddy statutes clean, and court declarations of unconstitu-
tionality reverse legislative excesses.46 But the venerable history of
arbitration proves that legal norms retain their vitality despite the
prevalence of nonjudicial decision-making.47  If arbitration
threatened society, our institutions would have disintegrated long
ago. Congested court dockets provide judges with ample opportu-
nity to nurture legal norms. Each year tens of thousands of cases
go to final judgment - volumes of decisions cram law libraries.
Like the universe itself, the law expands perpetually. We have
enough public law. Few cases present issues of sufficient moment
to demand the time of busy judges. Bringing every breach of con-
tract case, every fraud case, and every negligence case to court
would not advance values and norms, but would choke courts,
which struggle to meet clogged calendars.48
Kronstein, however, argues more persuasively that arbitration
carries the potential for abuse.49 He is right in warning that the
misuse of power extends beyond the halls of government. The
wealthy or influential may corrupt the arbitral process to their ad-
vantage. The powerful may coerce their weaker adversaries into a
private forum infused with bias; trade organizations may rig the
system to favor members over nonmembers.5"
46. Learned Hand toiled at the task of statutory construction. He described his
work as follows:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example,
merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to
cross-reference, exception upon exception - couched in abstract terms that
offer no handle to seize hold of - leave in my mind only a confused sense of
some vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my
duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most
inordinate expenditure of time.
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND 467 (1994) (quoting Learned Hand, Tribute to
Thomas Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947)).
47. See KELLOR, supra note 32, at 3-4 (tracing arbitration to the ancient Phoeni-
cian and Greek traders).
48. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 4, at 424 (suggesting that most divorce,
negligence and breach of contract cases do not present momentous issues requiring
judicial comment).
49. See Kronstein, supra note 41, at 40. Kronstein also notes that faulty arbitra-
tion decisions may affect unrepresented third parties adversely. See id. at 58-59. The
most salient example is antitrust decisions that have widespread economic conse-
quences. Fiss, too, warns that nonjudicial resolutions of disputes may harm third par-
ties. He offers racial discrimination cases as examples; a settlement may perpetuate
abusive discriminatory practices. See Fiss, supra note 44, at 1085.
50. See Kronstein, supra note 41, at 40.
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The courts must rescue the oppressed from overreaching.51 This
method of rescue may seem to contradict the thesis of this Article -
keeping governmental involvement at the minimum level necessary
to insure freedom of contract. Judicial review is, after all, a form of
government involvement. Recommending such judicial interven-
tion, however, does not betray this Article's thesis. Judicial action
is necessary to protect contract rights. The common law principle
of unconscionability does not tolerate coerced agreements. 2
Neither does contract law nor the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"
or the "Act") countenance corrupt arbitral proceeding 5 3 or cor-
rupt awards, both of which deny a party its reasonable contractual
expectation of a fair hearing. 4 Coerced agreements contradict
51. The common law contract doctrine of unconscionability condemns agreements
that result from unfair bargaining tactics and include unfair terms. See JOHN D.
CALAMARI AND JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-38, at 318 (2d. ed.
1977) (tracing the doctrine of unconscionability primarily to courts of equity); CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 559B (Supp. 1997) (noting that only grossly unfair contracts are
unenforceable under unconscionability doctrine); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabil-
ity and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967)
(coining the term "procedural unconscionability" to refer to predatory bargaining tac-
tics and the term "substantive unconscionability" to refer to grossly unfair terms);
John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 26
(1969) (proposing that only material terms should be subject to the unconscionability
defense); Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31
U. PITr. L. REV. 359, 368-69 (1970) (arguing that a party raising an unconscionability
defense should have to prove a prima facie case, that is, a substantial disparity be-
tween the value paid and the value received if the contract is enforced as written).
52. See Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. 254, 258 (1995) (observing that doctrines of unconscionability and public
policy protect "freedom from contract," that is, freedom from predatory or illegal
agreements).
53. Section 10 of the FAA provides for vacatur of an arbitration award "where an
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," and "where there was
evident partiality or corruption in arbitrators, or either of them." 9 U.S.C. § 10(1) &
(2) (1994). See infra Part II.A (discussing the FAA).
54. Arbitration implies the right to a fundamentally fair hearing. See, e.g., Yasuda
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 F.3d 345, 353 (7th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that courts have required arbitrators "to afford the parties a fundamen-
tally fair hearing prior to awarding relief"); Grovner v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 625
F.2d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that arbitration must provide "a fundamentally
fair hearing"); Totem Marine Tug & Barge v. North American Towing Inc., 607 F.2d
649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979) (observing that although arbitration "is much less formal than
a trial in court," the process grants the parties the right to a "fundamentally fair hear-
ing"); see generally IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREE-
MENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 32.3.1
(1994) (discussing the obligation of arbitrators to provide the parties with a funda-
mentally fair hearing); Kenneth R. Davis, Due Process Right to Judicial Review of
Arbitral Punitive Damages Awards, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 583, 601-602 (1995) (citing au-
thority for the proposition that courts require arbitrators to provide parties with a
fundamentally fair hearing).
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freedom of contract, depriving the aggrieved party of choice. Free-
dom of contract includes the freedom not to contract.5 5 Coopera-
tion, too, is incompatible with coercion. Judicial intervention in
these cases protects freedom of contract, and is therefore appropri-
ate and necessary. Rather than arguing against such judicial inter-
vention, the thesis of this Article requires it. The state must test
arbitration agreements against the principles of contract law. The
agreement must reflect the contractual intent of the parties, and it
must not be unconscionable, illegal under ordinary contract princi-
ples,56 or subject to any other contract defense.
H. Applying the Model
One may evaluate existing arbitration law by measuring that law
against the model of arbitration law proposed in this Article. Be-
cause the FAA is the foundation of federal arbitration law, the
analysis begins with the Act. The analysis will then turn to some of
the most controversial issues arising under arbitration law.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Judicial disfavor with arbitration agreements began in seven-
teenth century England with the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine,
and continued in the United States until the twentieth century.57
This doctrine denied enforcement of freely negotiated arbitration
55. See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Wither
Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1996) (noting that freedom of contract im-
plies freedom from contract).
56. The illegality must derive from general contract law rather than from rules
applicable only to arbitration agreements. See Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996). Special rules limiting the range of arbitration agreements
pose state interference with self-government and undue arrogation of state adjudica-
tive power.
57. See, e.g., Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 597-601 (1906) (acknowledging the
hostility of English courts to arbitration agreements); Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. K. B.
131, XCV Eng. Rep. 532 (1746) (refusing to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment because "the parties cannot oust this court" of jurisdiction). But see Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir. 1942) (mocking
the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine as an unprincipled rule of law). Although courts
would not specifically enforce arbitration agreements, they would enforce awards ren-
dered pursuant to such agreements. Clapham v. Hingham, 1 Bing. 86, 90, 130 Eng.
Rep. 36, 37 (1922) (stating that, although arbitration agreements are revocable, arbi-
tration awards are enforceable). See Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution
and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 252 (1987)
(noting that under the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine English courts would not specifi-
cally enforce arbitration agreements but they would enforce awards). See generally 1
WILNER, supra note 1, § 3:01, at 21-23 (discussing the history of the judicial hostility
toward arbitration agreements).
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agreements. Passed in 1925, the FAA repudiated the ancient hos-
tility toward arbitration.58 Although it would take some time for
this new policy to filter throughout the country,59 the FAA an-
nounced that arbitration agreements were as enforceable as other
contracts.6 ° Section 2 of the FAA says that a written arbitration
provision "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contracts."' 61 This most significant section of the FAA establishes
federal arbitration policy ensuring that "private agreements to ar-
bitrate are enforced according to their terms. ' 62 Its purpose is
merely to reject the courts' repugnance of arbitration and to make
arbitration agreements enforceable,63 not to place arbitration
agreements beyond the power of state regulation.64 The section,
for example, does not insulate arbitration agreements from com-
mon law contract defenses, such as lack of consideration, fraud,
duress, or the more general doctrine of unconscionability, which
subsumes many other contract defenses.65
58. Ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994)).
59. As late as 1953, the United States Supreme Court in Wilko, questioned the
fairness of arbitration. See supra note 13.
60. See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. 427, (refusing to enforce pre-dispute agreement to
arbitrate claims arising under Section 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933); American
Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (refusing to
enforce pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods. Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 626, 237
N.E.2d 223, 225, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1968) (holding state law antitrust claim
inarbitrable).
61. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
62. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (quoting Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior College,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)); see H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) ("This bill declares
simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a proce-
dure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.").
63. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) ("The FAA was designed 'to overrule the judi-
ciary's long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate"' (citing Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985))). See also H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at
1-2 (1924) ("The need for the FAA arises from.., the jealousy of the English courts
for their own jurisdiction .... This jealousy survived for so long a period that the
principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with
it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly
fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment.").
64. See Volt Information Sciences, 489 U.S. at 478-79 (holding California statute
providing for stay of arbitration consistent with FAA). See also Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (declining to hold that the FAA
preempts state law prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages).
65. See Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (quoting
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)) (holding that the FAA "pre-
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Section 2 is consistent with the thesis of this Article insofar as it
gives arbitration agreements broad range over virtually all dis-
putes, whether arising out of federal or state law, statute, or com-
mon law. The state should be wary of reserving spheres of conflict
for the courts, and depriving participants in the marketplace the
option of self-regulation. Only the courts, however, may deter-
mine whether the parties exercised freely their will to enter into an
arbitration agreement.66 Enforcing an agreement subject to a con-
tract defense denies one of the parties freedom of contract. The
courts must refuse to enforce legally defective arbitration agree-
ments.67 By making arbitration agreements subject to common law
contract defenses, the FAA, as written, establishes the proper fed-
eral arbitration policy.68
The FAA, however, diverges from the thesis proposed in this Ar-
ticle insofar as it tolerates non-contractual state limitations on arbi-
tration agreements. 69 Legal impediments to arbitration violate this
thesis, and any such impediment should stand only if it promotes a
policy that eclipses the policies served by arbitration: autonomy,
cooperation, and the curtailment of state power. Though the FAA
clude[s] States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring
instead that such provisions be placed 'upon the same footing as other contracts");
see generally Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996) (recognizing that con-
tract law defenses apply to arbitration agreements and all other agreements equally).
66. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Food & Conklin, Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), the
Supreme Court erroneously held that arbitrators decide threshold issues of enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements.
67. The Supreme Court's misguided arbitration policy might mislead some to con-
clude that arbitration agreements deserve a favored status exempting them from cer-
tain contract defenses. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (declaring that "as a matter of federal law, any doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration").
One might stumble deeper into this faulty conclusion by noting that the FAA pro-
vides for specific enforcement of arbitration agreements, a remedy unavailable in
most breach of contract actions. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). A simple observation refutes
this point. Under traditional contract law, specific performance is available when
money damages would provide inadequate relief. Much like an agreement to sell a
Stradivarius violin or a controlling interest of stock in a closely held corporation, dam-
ages are insufficient to redress the breach of an arbitration agreement. The parties
bargained for adjudication in an alternative forum; they bargained for privacy, effi-
ciency and self-regulation. Since the injury occasioned by the breach is not reducible
to dollars, specific performance is the appropriate contract remedy.
68. The Supreme Court, however, has in many cases misinterpreted the FAA, in-
sulating arbitration agreements from certain contract defenses. See infra notes 142-
157 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 118-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Volt decision).
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embodies a pro-arbitration policy,7" it permits state law to impose
procedural limitations on arbitration.71
One suspect limitation appears in the text of Section 2, which
provides for the enforcement only of written agreements to arbi-
trate,72 though courts enforce such agreements even if not signed.73
This Statute of Frauds intrudes on the freedom of parties to enter
into arbitration agreements. Prudence might urge parties to re-
duce arbitration agreements to writing, but arbitration law should
not foreclose the enforcement of oral agreements to arbitrate.
Congress undoubtedly required arbitration agreements to be in
writing, recognizing the significance of such agreements, which
trim the procedural and substantive rights that accompany litiga-
tion. A strict writing requirement is not needed to protect parties
who never agreed to arbitrate from dissembling adversaries. If a
party admitted under oath that he had entered into an oral arbitra-
tion agreement, no sound policy reason would allow that party to
avoid the agreement simply because it was not written.7 ' The prac-
tical consequences of this Statute of Frauds are undoubtedly minor,
since most parties formalize arbitration agreements, but the law
should not impose such a restriction. Yet such a Statute of Frauds
removes some disputes from the private sector and places them in
the public sector increasing the power of the judiciary.
Ostensibly applying the FAA, the United States Supreme Court
has decided numerous issues shaping arbitration policy. Unfortu-
nately, the Court has often failed to appreciate the purposes of the
FAA and the Court has therefore misapplied the statute.
Although some of these decisions advance the policies proposed in
this Article, many conflict with these policies. The result is a crip-
pled jurisprudence of arbitration.
70. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 118-129 and accompanying text.
72. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
73. See, e.g., Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that arbitration agreements must be in writing but that they need not be
signed); McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A&S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980)
(noting that a party may be bound to an unsigned arbitration agreement).
74. An analogy appears in the Uniform Commercial Code, which contains a stat-
ute of frauds requiring contracts for the sale of goods of $500 or more to be in writing.
See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1992). If, however, the party to be charged with the agreement
admits in a pleading, in testimony, or in court that he entered into the agreement, the
agreement is enforceable to the extent admitted. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (1992).
75. See 1 WILNER, supra note 1, § 6:01, at 73 (commenting that oral arbitration
agreements occur rarely except where an oral agreement extends an existing written
arbitration agreement).
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B. The Public Policy Defense
Although now discredited by the Supreme Court, the public pol-
icy defense, when in vogue, prohibited the arbitration of numerous
federal statutory claims.76 The Court established the defense in
Wilko v. Swan,77 a securities arbitration case in which the Court
held unenforceable a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a claim
under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act").78 Such agreements, the Court ruled, impermissibly waived
rights guaranteed by the Securities Act.79 Section 14 of the Act
forbids such waivers,80 and the Court concluded that a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement waives the statutory right of access to the
federal courts guaranteed under Section 22(a). 81 Rejecting the ar-
gument that arbitration is equivalent to litigation in a federal
court, 82 the Supreme Court catalogued deficiencies of the arbitral
process.83 It cited, for example, the lack of legal training of many
76. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (declining to enforce pre-
dispute agreement to arbitrate claims under Section 14 of the Securities Act); Page v.
Mosely, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding
RICO claims not arbitrable); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433
F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971) (holding patent validity
questions inappropriate for arbitration); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184
(1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990) (holding that an arbitration agree-
ment does not preclude access to a judicial forum for Title VII claims); Nicholson v.
CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act claims not arbitrable); Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d
923 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding ERISA claims arbitrable); American Safety Equip. Corp.
v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (refusing to allow arbitration of
claims arising out of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
77. 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see also Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d
334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the claim that an arbitration clause in a securities
customer account agreement was unconscionable).
78. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
79. See id. at 434-35.
80. Section 14 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any per-
son acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 48 Stat. 84, 15
U.S.C. § 77n (1994).
81. See id. Section 22(a) provides: "The district courts of the United States ...
shall have jurisdiction ... concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
[Adt]." 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1994).
82. See 1 WILNER, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 2 ("Arbitration, which involves a final
determination of disputes, has elements of the judicial process. Although an alterna-
tive to judicial decision-making, it does not replace it in all aspects, but rather co-
exists with court procedure as an adjunct and part of the American system of adminis-
tering justice.").
83. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
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arbitrators, and the failure of most awards to provide a rationale
for the arbitrators' decision.84
The Court's attacks on the procedural adequacy of arbitration,
whether justified or not, missed the point. Freely negotiated arbi-
tration agreements that are not vulnerable to ordinary contract de-
fenses deserve enforcement, even if the controversy implicates
federal statutory claims.85 If Congress foreclosed the arbitration of
a particular claim, the Court would have to respect congressional
intent, even though ill-advised. Were there such a statute, one
would have urged its repeal, but no such statutory prohibition ex-
isted. The problem lay, not with Congress, but with the Court's
interpretation of the Securities Act. Characterizing the right to
bring a Section 12(2) claim in federal court as inalienable provided
inadequate justification for denying arbitration. By this reasoning,
few federal statutory claims would ever be subject to arbitration by
operation of a pre-dispute agreement because most federal statutes
provide for federal court jurisdiction.86 Such a limitation on arbi-
tration would dwarf freedom of contract, by eliminating the arbi-
trability of a host of federal claims. The right to sue in federal
court would be converted into a requirement. Rather than having
a choice of forum, parties would lose the option of adjudication at
a non-public tribunal. The state would be creating a judicial mo-
nopoly over federal claims, bolstering its power, while weakening
the right of marketplace participants to regulate their affairs.
A more sensible reading of the Securities Act forbids waiver of
substantive rights, rather than procedural rights, conferred by the
84. See id.
85. Particularly in the area of antitrust law, many have disagreed with this posi-
tion. One commentator, for example, has argued that accomplishing the goals of ani-
trust law is incompatible with arbitration. See Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and
Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1076-81 (1969). He contends that
court judgments, unlike arbitration awards, deter future violations and that plaintiffs
in litigated cases enhance the regulatory function of the Federal Trade Commission by
acting as private attorneys general. See id. at 1073-74. But see John R. Allison, Arbi-
tration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of
Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 252-253 (1986) (arguing that antitrust
claims should be arbitrable, and pointing out that arbitrating antitrust claims harms
the public no more than settling antitrust claims).
86. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act, for example, provides for exclusive federal
court jurisdiction over claims arising under the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994). Addi-
tionally, the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") provide for exclusive jurisdiction in federal
court. See 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1994) (Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (Sherman Act); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (Civil Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (Title VII);
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994) (ADA).
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Act. After rendering several decisions undermining Wilko,87 the
Court ultimately arrived at this conclusion in Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon,88 in which the Court held enforceable a
pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims arising under Section 10
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).89
Although the Exchange Act has an anti-waiver provision90 and a
jurisdictional provision,91 both nearly identical to the provisions
determinative in Wilko, the Court held that the waiver provision in
the Exchange Act referred to substantive rather than procedural
rights, such as the right of access to federal courts.92 Inimical to the
reasoning in McMahon, Wilko survived merely because of the
Supreme Court's institutional loyalty to its prior decisions.93 A
vestige of the time when courts viewed arbitration with suspicion,
Wilko contradicted the Court's shift to a policy favoring arbitra-
tion, and the Court, therefore, could not tolerate Wilko in the post-
McMahon era.9a In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
87. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 509 (1974) (enforcing an
agreement to arbitrate a transnational dispute involving claims arising under Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act because the policies that necessitated the Wilko holding
were inapplicable in the arena of international trade); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-40 (1985) (enforcing an agreement to
arbitrate a transnational dispute involving Sherman Act antitrust claims).
88. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
89. See id. at 237-38.
90. See id. at 227. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act declares void "[a]ny condi-
tion, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of [the Exchange Act] .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
91. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides in
relevant part: "The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive juris-
diction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this title or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
92. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-29. The Court reasoned, in spite of Wilko, that
Section 29(a) forbids agreements to waive "compliance" with the provisions of the
Exchange Act. See id. Section 27, the jurisdictional provision, however, imposed no
statutory duties requiring "compliance." Hence the waiver provision did not refer to
the jurisdictional provision. See id. at 228.
93. Determined to reconcile Wilko with McMahon, the Court suggested that Sec-
tion 12(2) rights are "special" in comparison to Section 10(b) rights because Section
12(2) provides a form of strict liability eliminating elements such as due diligence and
causation. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-29. This rationale is unpersuasive, how-
ever, since both sections protect investors from securities fraud, and since Section
12(2) applies only to sellers whereas Section 10(b) applies more broadly to certain
nonsellers.
94. See id. at 256-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discerning no meaningful distinc-
tion between the statutory scheme of the Securities Act on which Wilko ruled and the
statutory scheme of the Exchange Act on which McMahon ruled). Justice Stevens
noted that Wilko had stood for thirty-two years, a longevity which created a presump-
tion of congressional approval. See id. at 268-69 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
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press, Inc.,9' the Court abandoned the charade that Wilko and Mc-
Mahon could be reconciled and held Section 12(2) claims
arbitrable.96
Wilko seems today an anachronism, an arbitrary obstacle to free-
dom of contract and self-government. Nevertheless, Wilko identi-
fied a serious shortcoming of arbitration, not easily dismissed.
However confusingly, Wilko suggested correctly that the narrow
scope of judicial review would perpetuate legal error in arbitration
awards.97 McMahon scorned this concern, comforting us with the
dissenting in part). Abandoning the doctrine, therefore, should have been left to
Congress. See id. at 269. (Stevens J., concurring part and dissenting in part).
95. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
96. Since Rodriquez de Quijas, the public policy defense has faded into disrepute,
and courts now enforce pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate virtually any federal
claim. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (subject-
ing Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims to arbitration); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that Title VII claims can be
subject to arbitration); Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1116
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA claims can be subject to arbitration); Mago v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the em-
ployee failed to establish that Congress, in enacting Title VII, intended to preclude
arbitration of Title VII claims); Bird v. Shearson Lehman/ American Express, Inc.,
926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that Congress did not intend to preclude a
waiver of a judicial forum for statutory ERISA claims and, furthermore, that the FAA
requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate such claims); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title VII claims can be
subject to arbitration).
97. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37. The Court lapsed into enigmatic language when
it stated:
Power to vacate an award is limited. While it may be true, as the Court of
Appeals thought, that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance
with the provisions of the Securities Act would 'constitute grounds for vacat-
ing the award pursuant to Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,' that
failure would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submission,
such as the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the
law by the.arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.
Id. Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, questioned why the Court had drifted
into this unfortunate language which unnecessarily declares that courts may not re-
view arbitral awards for errors of law. See id. at 438-39 (Jackson, J., concurring). In
dissent, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Minton, argued that Section 10 of the
FAA grants courts the authority to review arbitral awards for legal error. See id. at
439-40.
The judicial word salad in the majority opinion led to adoption of the manifest
disregard test, and it has elicited endless criticism. Some believe the standard is too
broad. See, e.g., Michael P. O'Mullan, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Se-
curities Arbitration: An Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1121, 1135 (1995) (faulting the manifest disregard standard for
compromising the finality of arbitration awards); Brad A. Galbraith, Vacatur of Com-
mercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the
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bromide that the scope of judicial review is sufficient "to ensure
that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute." 98
Three years earlier, in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ,99
the Court sought to mollify fears of arbitrating Sherman Act anti-
trust claims in international tribunals announcing that "it would
not require intrusive [judicial] inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal
took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided
them."1 ° Unfortunately, these assurances of adequate judicial
oversight misstate the practice of most federal courts. The prevail-
ing standard of review - the manifest disregard test - permits
vacatur only when arbitrators intentionally disregard the law. 10 1
"Manifest Disregard" of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REV. 241, 259 (1993) (criticizing
the manifest disregard test because it encourages costly and lengthy motions and ap-
peals); Marta B. Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard, 49 Disp.
RESOL. J. 64, 67 (June 1994) (lambasting the manifest disregard standard for encour-
aging pointless motions and appeals which rob arbitration of finality). Others criticize
the manifest disregard test because it is too narrow. See, e.g., MACNEIL ET AL., supra
note 54, at § 40.7.2.5, 40:94 (deploring the manifest disregard test for permitting arbi-
trators to render awards without regard to controlling law); Richard E. Speidel, Arbi-
tration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 157, 198 (1989) (opposing the manifest disregard test
because it effectively precludes judicial correction of error in arbitral awards). Still
others argue that the test is superfluous. See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disar-
ray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV.
731, 816-17 (1996) (construing the manifest disregard to overlap with Section 10(d)(3)
of the FAA which provides for judicial vacatur when arbitrators to engage in im-
proper conduct); Bret F. Randall, Comment, The History, Application, and Policy of
the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 BYU L. REv.
759, 768 n.51 (1992) (suggesting that the manifest disregard test merely redefines er-
ror reversible under Section 10 of the FAA).
98. 482 U.S. at 232.
99. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
100. Id. at 638.
101. First suggested in murky dicta in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953),
the manifest disregard test has bloomed into the predominant standard of review of
arbitration awards, although several versions of the test have developed. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986) is a seminal
case defining the test. Bobker held that the manifest disregard test is met when an
arbitrator knew controlling law but nevertheless disregarded it. See id. at 933. The
Bobker view of manifest disregard predominates among the circuits. Flexible Mfg.
Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prod. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that mani-
fest disregard requires arbitrators to ignore deliberately law known to them); Kanuth
v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that
manifest disregard occurs when the arbitrators correctly state the law and proceed to
ignore it); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988)
(remarking that manifest disregard "deals mainly with willful inattentiveness to the
governing law"). Some courts have adopted more liberal versions of the test. In Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 422 (6th Cir. 1995), the
court equated the manifest disregard test with the standard of rationality. Adopting
an even more liberal standard, Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir.
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Applying this test, courts routinely confirm legally erroneous
awards.10 2
The solution, however, is not to deny arbitrability. Rather, the
courts should broaden their scope of review. When parties agree to
arbitrate federal statutory claims, or claims under any particular
law, they implicitly instruct the arbitrators to apply controlling law
correctly. 10 3 Parties do not expect arbitrators to misapply the law.
Upon entering into an arbitration agreement, if told that a review-
ing court would confirm an erroneous award, the parties would
surely object, for they envision judicial review of such errors. Yet
the predominant version of the manifest disregard standard ignores
this expectation. By reviewing awards for errors of law, the courts
would meet party expectations and preserve guaranteed rights.10 4
1997), held that all errors of statutory interpretation, whether deliberate or not, con-
stitute manifest disregard. Yet another recent relaxation of the manifest disregard
standard permits vacatur based on errors of fact as opposed to errors of law. See
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998). But see Marshall v.
Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1991) (expressing reservations about the
manifest disregard test); R.M. Perez & Associates, Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534 (5th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting the manifest disregard test in any form); Raiford v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 903 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the manifest
disregard test in any form). See generally Eric P. Tuchman, Claims Resulting From
Employment Discrimination, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 5, 1998, at 3 (discussing the impact of
Halligan on the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards).
102. See, e.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 822 (1997) (sus-
taining erroneous denial of attorneys' fees in ADA arbitration); Willemijn Houd-
stermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1997)
(upholding award even if based on misinterpretation of law); Advest, Inc. v. McCar-
thy, 914 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1990) (confirming award that assessed wrong measure
of damages); San Martine Compania de Navagacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals,
Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1961) (confirming award although its legal accuracy
was questionable).
103. See Davis, Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 123-126 (arguing that when parties
submit a federal claim to arbitration, they reasonably expect the court to review the
award for errors of law). But see Hayford, supra note 97, at 742-43 (concluding that
most arbitration agreements evidence the intent of the parties to forego judicial
review).
104. See Ian M. Comisky & Marvin Comisky, Commercial Arbitration - Panacea
or Nightmare?, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 457, 507 (1974) (advocating judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards for legal error but that such review be limited to a single instance without
further appeal); Francis T. Freeman Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial
Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519, 556 (1960) (comparing the folly of confirming an erro-
neous award to the folly of affirming an erroneous judgment); C. Evan Stewart, Secur-
ities Arbitration Appeal: An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79 Ky. L.J. 347, 368 (1990/1991)
(proposing that the scope of judicial review of securities arbitration awards be ex-
panded to ensure that arbitrators, who are often untrained to cope with complex se-
curities law, are subject to judicial oversight); Philip G. Phillips, Note, Rules of Law or
Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590, 613 (1934) (favoring
expanded judicial review of arbitration awards). But see Varelo Ref., supra note 73, at
64, 75 (opposing expanded review of arbitration awards because such review would
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A small dose of governmental intervention, in the form of judicial
review would obviate the need to preclude arbitration and to force
government-controlled adjudication on the parties. The arbitration
agreement would be enforced, judicial review would accord with
the intent of the parties, and governmental judicial power would be
minimized.
The public policy defense barred the arbitration of statutory
claims that the courts believed fell outside the competence of arbi-
tration. Aside from the public policy defense, which was judge-
made law,. various state legislatures have enacted statutes placing
express limitations on arbitration. Such "special" restrictions on
arbitration agreements prevent parties from entering into arbitra-
tion agreements unwittingly and protect them from arbitration
under circumstances where the state believes the courts would pro-
vide a more suitable forum. The motivation for such law is benign;
the government shields the potential victim - the small business op-
erator, the employee, and the consumer. When such limitations
exceed the strictures of general common law, however, they con-
tradict the autonomy of the parties to the arbitration agreement
and frustrate the parties' efforts at cooperation. Special restric-
tions on arbitration may dislodge the dispute from the private sec-
tor, shunting the dispute to the courts. Such law violates all the
social policies that arbitration serves.
C. Special State Law Restrictions
Some legislation, like the public policy defense, forbids the arbi-
tration of certain claims.10 5 Other legislation provides procedures
interfering with arbitration, 10 6 and a third category has conditioned
the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with
special contractual requirements applicable only to arbitration
agreements. 10 7
The California Franchise Investment Law was an example of a
state statute prohibiting the arbitration of a class of claims.0 8 In
Southland Corp. v. Keating,10 9 the Supreme Court invalidated the
statute. Owners of 7-Eleven convenience stores sued Southland,
compromise the finality of arbitration); Note, Judicial Supervision of Commercial Ar-
bitration, 53 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1081 & n.3 (1965) (questioning whether the scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards should be expanded).
105. See infra notes 108-116 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 118-129 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
108. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
109. Id.
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the franchisor, for breach of contract, in tort, and for violations of
California's Franchise Investment Law.11 ° Based on arbitration
clauses in the franchise agreements, Southland moved to compel
arbitration, 1 ' but the California Supreme Court denied the appli-
cation insofar as it sought the arbitration of claims arising out of
the California statute.1 2 The California court ruled that only courts
may determine such claims." 3 Finding that "Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements,""' 4 the United States Supreme Court held
that state law bans on classes of claims violate the FAA.115 The
Court ruled therefore that the FAA preempted the California stat-
ute's prohibition of the arbitration of claims arising under the
statute."
16
Southland misinterpreted the FAA, which Congress intended to
be a procedural statute applicable only to federal courts." 7 Never-
110. See id. at 4.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 5.
113. See Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 31 Cal.3d 584, 627 (1982),
overruled by Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The court rejected the
argument that the FAA preempts California's statutory requirement of judicial,
rather than arbitral, determination of claims brought under the California Franchise
Investment Law. See id. The court grounded its holding on the strength of Califor-
nia's public policy to protect investors as evidenced in a regulatory scheme, and on
the similarity between California's policy to protect franchise investors and the fed-
eral policy to protect securities investors. See id. at 604.
114. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
115. See id.
116. See id. Justice Stevens took a more moderate view than the majority, asserting
that the purpose of the FAA is to overcome judicial hostility toward arbitration agree-
ments, not to deny the states the authority to legislate in the area of arbitration. See
id. at 18-19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argued that
state law limitations on the scope of arbitration agreements should not be per se un-
enforceable, if the limitations are based on strong public policy consistent with federal
law. See id. at 21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Justice O'Connor, in a persuasive dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued
that the FAA, as enacted, was a procedural statute applicable to federal courts, and
that Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to the states. See id. at 21-23
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor relied on the legislative history of the
FAA. She cited, for example, the American Bar Association, which wrote: "'[t]he
statute establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements .... A Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements does relate solely to procedure of the Federal courts."' Id. at 26
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial
Law, The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 154-55
(1925)). In addition, Julius Henry Cohen, who drafted the bill, informed two congres-
sional subcommittees at a joint hearing that Congress, by enacting the FAA, was "'di-
recting its own courts .... There is not disposition therefore by means of the Federal
bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration en-
190
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theless, Southland advanced the policies highlighted in this Article.
By prohibiting the arbitration of claims brought under the
Franchise Investment Law, California law had created its own ad-
judicative monopoly. Annulling the statute vindicated the contrac-
tual right of parties to establish a private forum to decide such
claims. Southland contracted the compass of state adjudicative
power while expanding the scope of self-government.
The issue in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior University118 was more complex, for it
concerned whether the Court would enforce a choice-of-law Clause
that operated to impose a stay of arbitration. In Volt, the parties to
a construction contract entered into an arbitration agreement
which included a California choice-of-law clause. When a dispute
arose, Volt demanded arbitration. 119 In response, Stanford com-
menced an action in California state court against Volt, and in that
action Stanford also sought indemnification from third parties that
had not agreed to arbitrate their dispute with Southland.120 Rely-
ing on the choice-of-law clause, Stanford moved to stay arbitration
invoking a California statute, which permitted the court to stay ar-
bitration pending resolution of a related, state court action involv-
ing parties not subject to arbitration. 2 '
The Supreme Court correctly discerned no conflict between the
FAA and the California statute. 22 The FAA preempts state law
bans on arbitrating any category of claim, but it does not require
adherence to particular procedural rules.123 It therefore does not
forcement."' Id. at 26-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Arbitration of Interstate
Commercial Disputes, Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the Subcommit-
tees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1924)).
118. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
119. See id. at 470.
120. See id. at 470-71.
121. See id. at 471. Volt petitioned the California appellate court to compel arbitra-
tion and to stay the California trial court litigation until arbitration was completed.
See id. at 471 n.2.
122. See id. at 471 n.3.
123. See id. at 476.
There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of proce-
dural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, accord-
ing to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate. Interpreting a choice-
of-law clause to make applicable state rules governing the conduct of arbi-
tration - rules which are manifestly designed to encourage resort to the
arbitral process - simply does not offend the rule of liberal construction set
forth in Moses H. Cone, nor does it offend any other policy embodied in the
FAA.
Id. The Court added that the California statute furthered federal arbitration policy by
providing sensible rules for multiparty contractual disputes. See id. at 476 n.5.
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preempt state law governing arbitral procedures. 24 The Court rec-
ognized that the California law did not bar the arbitration of any
disputes, but merely established procedural rules governing arbi-
tration. 25 The parties, by incorporating a California choice-of-law
clause into their contract, expressed their intent to submit to Cali-
fornia's arbitral procedures. 26 Even if the result of their selection
of California law was to stay arbitration, the parties' intent to fol-
low California law determined the outcome. 27 The Court noted,
in addition, that the California statute is consistent with the FAA
because the statute provides a procedure for avoiding contradic-
tory judgments that might arise if two parallel proceedings, one in
arbitration and the other in court, proceeded simultaneously.
28
Such a sensible procedure might encourage arbitration.
129
The California statute addressed in Volt, however, violates the
thesis of this Article. Even if it provides a workable rule to avoid
conflicting outcomes, the California statute establishes a mecha-
nism for delaying arbitration and perhaps denying meaningful arbi-
tration if the parallel court action decides arbitrable issues. This
level of state interference potentially strips the parties of the power
to create a private forum for dispute resolution. The incursion is
procedural and subtle. While it does not outlaw the enforceability
of a single arbitration agreement, and therefore conforms to the
124. See id. at 477 n.6. The Court distinguished Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16
n.10 (1984) on this basis. See also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987) (hold-
ing that the FAA preempts a California state statute precluding the arbitration of
certain wage collection claims). The Court subsequently decided Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 839 (1995) (holding that the FAA preempts
an Alabama state statute invalidating all pre-dispute arbitration agreements). The
Allied-Bruce Court also confronted the issue of whether the FAA's scope, which in-
cludes any contract evidencing a transaction "involving commerce," is co-extensive
with the scope of the commerce clause which reaches transactions "affecting com-
merce." Id. The Court found the two provisions to be co-extensive. See id.
125. See 489 U.S. at 476-79.
126. See id.
127. See id. Joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan noted that "[a]pplying the
California procedural rule, which stays arbitration while litigation of the same issue
goes forward, means simply that the parties' dispute will be litigated rather than arbi-
trated." Id. at 487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 476 n.5.
129. See id. (surmising that the California statute would foster arbitration because
"the FAA itself contains no provision designed to deal with the special practical
problems that arise in multiparty contractual disputes when some or all of the con-
tracts at issue include agreements to arbitrate"). But see id. at 487 n.8 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that whether the California stay statute ultimately fosters arbitra-
tion is irrelevant, because the only pertinent issue is whether the California statute
enforces arbitration agreements, as the FAA requires).
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FAA, it nevertheless tends to place disputes otherwise destined for
arbitration into the hands of the state.
If, however, parties to an arbitration agreement include a provi-
sion limiting the scope of arbitrable issues or remedies, or if they
adopt procedures that may postpone or even foreclose arbitration,
those provisions must be honored. Thus, the courts must enforce
an express provision in the agreement, which, like the California
statute, calls for a stay of arbitration. The arbitration agreement
determines the scope of arbitration and the rules under which it is
conducted. The state must enforce party intent.
Broader than current arbitration policy the arbitration policy pro-
posed in this Article, would expressly nullify any state law restrict-
ing arbitration. 130 Such a policy would preempt the California law,
and the parties' adoption of a choice-of-law provision therefore
would not imply adoption of a California law expressly invalidated
under principles of federal preemption.
More recently, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,131 the
Court concluded that special rules interfering with the enforcement
of arbitration agreements violate the FAA. Casarotto concerned a
special restriction on the form of arbitration agreements rather
than a special restriction on the scope of arbitration agreements, as
in Southland, or a special restriction on procedures applicable to
arbitration, as in Volt. Casarotto purchased a Subway sandwich
franchise from Doctor's Associates. The franchise agreement con-
tained an arbitration clause. 32 When Casarotto brought suit
against Doctor's Associates for breach of contract and various
torts, Doctor's Associates sought to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration. 3 3 Casarotto challenged the arbitration clause, because
it failed to satisfy Montana law which required arbitration clauses
to be "typed in underlined capitals on the first page of the con-
tract. 1 34 The Supreme Court held that the FAA forbids special
limitations on arbitration agreements, and that federal policy
130. To come within the reach of federal law, the arbitration agreement would have
to affect interstate commerce. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that the reach of the FAA is co-exten-
sive with the scope of the commerce clause).
131. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
132. See id. at 683.
133. See id.
134. Id. The Montana statute provided more fully: "Notice that a contract is sub-
ject to arbitration ... shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of
the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be
subject to arbitration." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (repealed 1997).
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therefore preempted the Montana statute.135 If the notice provi-
sion had applied to all contracts, it would have been enforceable,
but because it applied only to arbitration agreements, it was
unenforceable.136
The Casarotto decision relied on Section two of the FAA, which
makes arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts.137
Section 2 preserves the applicability of ordinary contract defenses
to arbitration agreements, but it forbids the creation of defenses
unique to arbitration. As Casarotto instructs, Section 2 prevents
state law from disregarding the contractual intent of the parties by
invalidating otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements.
Casarotto also satisfies the thesis of this Article. If the Montana
law were upheld, disputes earmarked for arbitration would be
detoured to the courts, and the sphere of private adjudication
would dwindle.
D. Threshold Issues
Even when no law blocks the arbitration of a particular claim,
threshold issues of enforceability of the agreement may arise. A
party may resist arbitration on the ground that assent to the agree-
ment was fraudulently induced, coerced, or manipulated by some-
one in a position of trust. When a party interposes a defense
assailing the validity of assent, the issue arises whether the court or
the arbitrator should determine the validity of the defense.
Section 2 of the FAA provides, as it should, that arbitration
agreements are-subject to common law defenses.138 If, for exam-
ple, a party fraudulently induces another into an arbitration agree-
ment, the aggrieved party should be permitted to present its
contract defense to a court. By asserting a fraud defense, the ag-
grieved party has brought into question the validity of the arbitra-
tion agreement. If a party raises a threshold issue of enforceability,
the arbitrator should not decide the issue, since the issue for deci-
sion impugns the very agreement that purportedly confers author-
ity on him.
The FAA implies correctly that the court, not the arbitrator, de-
cides threshold issues of enforceability. By stating that written ar-
135. See 517 U.S. at 686-88.
136. See id. at 686-87.
137. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1012-13 (1996) (agreeing with




bitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity," '139 Section 2 suggests that until the thresh-
old issue of enforceability is resolved, the arbitration agreement is
not enforceable. The court is therefore the proper tribunal to re-
solve the threshold issue. If the court finds fraud, the arbitration
agreement fails, for the arbitrator never had authority to decide
any issue, threshold or ultimate. If the court rejects the fraud de-
fense, the matter proceeds to arbitration. Section 4 confirms that
the court decides threshold issues.140 That section provides that
"[i]f the making of the agreement ... be in issue, the court shall
proceed summarily to the trial thereof.' 14 1 If, for example, a party
interposes a fraud, incapacity, duress, or unconscionability defense,
"the making of the agreement" is at issue, and the court, not the
arbitrator, must determine the validity of the defense.
Reserving for the court the responsibility to make such rulings
does not infringe on the parties' freedom of contract. Nor does
such a reservation of authority unduly expand governmental adju-
dicative power. If a party has an arguable contract defense to an
alleged arbitration agreement, the state should not force that party
to arbitrate any issues until the court has ruled the agreement
valid. To compel arbitration prematurely would trample the ag-
grieved party's freedom of contract.
The Supreme Court has abandoned the wisdom of the FAA, im-
plementing misguided arbitration policy.142 Thus, when fraud is an
alleged defense to arbitrability (and, by analogy, when a party in-
terposes any defense to arbitrability), the arbitrators, not the
courts, decide the issue. 143 In Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin
139. Id.
140. Section 4 of the FAA provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in such agreement .... The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbi-
tration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the agreement .... If the making of the arbitration agreement
or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court
shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
141. Id.
142. See supra note 94-96 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court cases es-
pousing pro-arbitration policy).
143. See infra notes 144-157 and accompanying text.
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Mfg.,144 Prima Paint and Flood & Conklin entered into a Consult-
ing Agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. 45 When a
dispute arose, Flood & Conklin served notice to arbitrate. 46 Prima
Paint resisted arbitration asserting a fraudulent inducement de-
fense. 47 The issue was whether the court or the arbitrators should
decide if Flood & Conklin had fraudulently induced Prima Paint to
sign the Consulting Agreement. 148 The Supreme Court held that
the arbitrators should decide the issue,'149 adopting the "separabil-
ity" doctrine.150 Donning their magician's robes, a majority of Jus-
tices pretended that the fraud arguably invalidating a contract has
no effect on the validity of an arbitration clause within the
contract.' 5'
The errant reasoning of Prima Paint applies by analogy to any
contract defense. 52 If the defense does not apply specifically to
the arbitration clause as opposed to the whole contract, the defense
does not attach to the arbitration clause.' 53 Rarely will predatory
144. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
145. Id. at 398. The typical broad arbitration clause provided: "Any claim or con-
troversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration in the City of New York, in accordance with the rules then
obtaining with the American Arbitration Association." Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 399. Prima Paint commenced an action in federal district court to
enjoin arbitration. Flood & Conklin moved, pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA, to
compel arbitration. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 404.
150. Id. at 402. See also R.M. Perez & Assoc., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 538-39
(5th Cir. 1992) (directing arbitrators to hear claims that securities client agreements
and options agreements resulted from fraud where the alleged acts of fraud did not
relate to the arbitration clauses per se).
151. See 388 U.S. at 402. The Court concluded that when a party alleges that fraud
induced the contract as a whole the issue goes to the arbitrator. When, on the other
hand, a party alleges that fraud attached specifically to the arbitration clause rather
than the contract as a whole, the issue goes to the court. See id. at 402, 406-07. Justice
Black dissented. He believed that the FAA makes enforceability issues subject to
state law, id. at 412-15, and he found that under controlling New York law issues of
arbitrability are for the court to decide. See id. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting). See
Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, HOFSTRA L. REV.
84, 131 (1996) (criticizing the Prima Paint decision for adopting the separability
doctrine).
152. See infra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
153. See C.B.S. Emp. Fed. Cr. Union v. Donaldson, 912 F.2d 1563, 1567 (6th Cir.
1990) ("The Prima Paint doctrine is not limited, however, to rescission based on
fraudulent inducement, but extends to all challenges to the making of a contract."
(quoting Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645, 653 (E.D. Cal. 1986))); Unionmutual
Stock Life Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1985) ("The
teaching of Prima Paint is that a federal court must not remove from the arbitrators
consideration of a substantive challenge to a contract unless there has been an in-
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conduct, such as duress or overreaching, focus specifically on an
arbitration provision. Under Prima Paint, therefore, the determi-
nation of the validity of contract defenses enters the realm of arbi-
trability, even though the validity of the very agreement conferring
authority on the arbitrator is at issue. In Rojas v. TK Communica-
tions, Inc.,1 the Fifth Circuit relegated the issue of unconsciona-
bility to an arbitrator.155 The plaintiff asserted a sexual harassment
claim against her employer, and when the employer moved to dis-
miss the complaint on the ground that Rojas' employment agree-
ment contained an arbitration clause, Rojas countered that the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable. 56 The court ceded the
unconscionability issue to the arbitrator, because Rojas challenged
the entire contract, not the arbitration clause specifically.
157
Despite Prima Paint, many courts, loathe to relinquish their au-
thority to decide questions presented to them, simply rule on
threshold issue of enforceability. 158 Unfortunately, most of these
courts, in cases where unconscionability is interposed as a defense,
uphold arbitration agreements despite distressing proof of over-
reaching and unfairness. Until a recent NASD rule change, courts
dependent challenge to the making of the arbitration clause itself. The basis of the
underlying challenge to the contract does not alter the severability principle.").
154. 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996).
155. See id. at 749.
156. See id. at 746-47.
157. See id. at 749. The court noted that Rojas argued that her employer had mis-
represented the terms of her employment agreement and that Rojas had alleged that
her employer had had an undue bargaining advantage. See id. at 749 n.3. Because
these arguments focused on the agreement as a whole, rather than on the arbitration
clause specifically, the court referred the unconscionability issue to arbitration. See
id. at 749. See also Satarino v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 609, 613
(N.D. Tex. 1996) (relying on Rojas and directing to arbitration the claim that an em-
ployment agreement of a securities firm employee was an unenforceable contract of
adhesion).
158. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 98-
1246, 1998 WL 880910, *21 (1st Cir. Dec. 22, 1998) (sustaining the mandatory arbitra-
tion of Title VII claims in securities industry); Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252,
259 (5th Cir. 1996) (enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agree-
ments between brokerage firm and employees because employees failed to prove
fraud, duress or lack of appreciation for the consequences of arbitration clauses); Bar-
rowclough v. Kidder Peabody, Inc., 752 F.2d 923, 937 (3d Cir. 1985) (enforcing
mandatory arbitration clauses in employee agreements between brokerage firms and
employees despite universal requirement of such clauses); Pierson v. Dean, Witter,
Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting claim that mandatory arbi-
tration clause in securities customer account agreement was unconscionable although
accompanying choice-of-law clause implied waiver of right to punitive relief); see
Dean ,Witter, Reynolds, Inc. v. Sanchez Espada, 959 F. Supp. 73, 79 (D. Puerto Rico
1997) (stating that threshold issues of whether the parties entered into an arbitration
agreement are for the courts).
1999]
198 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
routinely sustained mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
contracts of securities employees, despite the requirement that se-
curities employees had to sign contracts containing such clauses or
not work in the industry.159 Arbitration associations instruct arbi-
trators, tacitly or expressly, that they need not follow positive
law,'160 and the prevailing standard of judicial review - the manifest
disregard test - permits the court to vacate an award only if the
arbitrator intentionally disregarded the law.' Forcing employees
to arbitrate claims is oppressive. 62 Federal courts fail to apply
common law defenses to arbitration agreements because the
Supreme Court has distorted arbitration policy.1 63 This failure re-
sults in the enforcement of arbitration agreements that courts
should reject as unconscionable.
E. Punitive Damages
Perhaps the most controversial issue in arbitration is whether pu-
nitive damages should be an available remedy. Although prohibi-
159. Mandatory arbitration of claims brought by securities employees "is an indus-
try-wide practice, with no opportunity for individual modification." 140 CONG. REC.
E1753-02 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1994) (statement of Rep. Markey). See also NASD Code
of Arb. Proc. § 1201 (CCH NASD Manual 1997, 1998) (amended by SR-NASD-97,
eff. Jan. 1, 1999). But see SEC RULE 97-77 (June 22, 1998) (adopting the NASD's
proposal to exempt claims of sexual or racial harassment and discrimination from
mandatory arbitration); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1199
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding mandatory securities arbitration contrary to Title VII), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (Nov. 9, 1998).
160. SROs, such as the NASD and NYSE, handle an enormous number of securi-
ties arbitrations. See Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, supra note 39, at 491.
The Arbitrator's Manual, a handbook provided to all SRO arbitrators, says: "Arbitra-
tors are not strictly bound by case precedent or statutory law. Rather, they are guided
by their analysis, by the underlying policies of the law and are given wide latitude in
their interpretation of legal concepts." THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL (Securities In-
dustry Conference on Arbitration 27-28 (1996)) [herinafter ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL].
161. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (discussing and criticizing the
manifest disregard test).
162. See Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securi-
ties Industry, 78 B.U. L: REv. 255, 259 (1998) (arguing that mandatory arbitration in
the securities industry is unconscionable because arbitrators are not required to fol-
low controlling law and courts do not correct legal error in arbitral awards). A vast
body of federal case law, however, upholds mandatory arbitration agreements in the
securities industry. Schuetz v. CS First Boston Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11612
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1997) (gender discrimination); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (sexual harassment); Willis v. Dean, Witter, Reyn-
olds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991). The SEC has approved an NASD rule which
eliminates the blanket requirement of mandatory arbitration of discrimination claims
in the securities industry. SEC RULE 97-77 (June 22, 1998).
163. See supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's pro-arbitration policy).
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tions against punitive damages are "special restrictions" on
arbitration, the punitive damages issue has stirred so much interest
that this Article treats the issue separately. The issue emerged in
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,164 in which an author alleged in arbitra-
tion that her publisher had maliciously refused to pay her royalties.
Finding for the author, the arbitration panel awarded her compen-
satory and punitive damages. 165 The Court of Appeals vacated the
punitive award, because the majority of the Court believed that
only the state should wield the power to impose punitive reme-
dies. 66 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Breitel observed that
the state, not private arbitrators, must serve as "the engine for im-
posing social sanction.' 67 Public policy, therefore, prohibited par-
ties from delegating to arbitrators the power to punish. 68
This public policy argument has enlisted support in several juris-
dictions. 69 Its luster derives from the traditional role of the gov-
ernment as the agent of punishment. Criminal law is an exclusive
164. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d. 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
165. See id. at 356.
166. See id. at 358.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 360 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Justice Gabrielli rejected the premise
that arbitral awards of punitive damages violate public policy. See id. at 361. To sup-
port his view, he cited a recent Court of Appeals decision sustaining an arbitral award
of treble liquidated damages, which he characterized as a penalty and therefore indis-
tinguishable from punitive damages. See id. Because the award in Garrity was
neither "irrational or unjust," he would have confirmed it. Id. at 364.
169. See, e.g., McElroy v. Waller, 731 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (apply-
ing Arkansas statute that forecloses arbitral punitive awards); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding punitive
damages unavailable in commercial arbitration); Shaw v. Kuhnel Assoc., Inc., 698
P.2d 880, 882 (N.M. 1985) (following the Garrity rule). But see Complete Interiors,
Inc. v. Behan, 558 So.2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (denying arbitrator the author-
ity to award punitive damages unless the arbitration agreement expressly confers such
authority); Belko v. AVX Corp., 1988 Cal. LEXIS 862 (Dec. 8, 1988) (upholding im-
plied agreement to authorize arbitral punitive awards); but cf. Starkenstein v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 189, 191-92 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (con-
cluding that Florida law permits arbitrators to award punitive damages); Baker v.
Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618 (1984) (permitting arbitrators to award punitive dam-
ages even without express authorization); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331
S.E.2d 726, 734 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (ruling that clause directing arbitration of claims
arising out of contractual relationship impliedly authorized punitive awards); Gris-
som v. Greener & Sumner Constr.; Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(supporting rule that arbitrators have authority to award punitive damages unless the
agreement divests them of such authority). See generally Kenneth R. Davis, A Pro-
posed Framework for Reviewing Punitive Damages Awards of Commercial Arbitra-
tors, 58 ALB. L. REV. 55, 62-65 (1994) (discussing Garrity and reviewing the different
positions states have taken regarding the availability of punitive damages in commer-
cial arbitration).
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province of the state,'170 and although society values freedom of
contract, public policy imposes limits on one's right to submit to
punishment contractually. Courts will not enforce a private agree-
ment in which a party has consented to be imprisoned or enslaved.
Punitive damages, like criminal law, penalizes wrongdoers and de-
ters misconduct. 171 The analogy between criminal law and punitive
damages has led many to condemn punitive arbitral awards, which
arguably represent a usurpation of the state's exclusive power to
punish. 17
2
Garrity, however, interferes with the social policies that arbitra-
tion serves. In regulating private arbitration, the state's only ap-
propriate role is to enforce arbitration agreements according to the
common law of contracts. In other words, the state must engage in
the minimal amount of regulation necessary to achieve the intent
of the parties to the agreement. Contract law embodies public pol-
icy limitations on agreements, such as agreements subjecting a
170. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 321 (1947) (not-
ing that only the state inflicts criminal punishment); WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND AUSTIN
W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 3, at 11 (1972) (remarking that
"[w]ith crimes, the state itself brings criminal proceedings to protect the public
interest").
171. See 1 JAMES D. GHIARDI AND JOHN J. KIRCHNER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, LAW
AND PRACTICE, § 2.01, at 1 (1998) (stating that punishment and deterrence are the
objectives of punitive damages); 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER AND KENNETH R. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A), at 28 (3d ed. 1995) (noting that the principal purposes
of punitive damages are "to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and to deter him
and others from similar misconduct"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1)
(1979) ("Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal dam-
ages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter
him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.").
172. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 359, 353 N.E.2d 793, 796-97, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (1976) (commenting that "[f]or centuries the power to punish has
been a monopoly of the State"); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 102 N.M. 607, 609 (Sup.
Ct. 1985) (holding that the authority to award punitive damages "is reserved to the
courts"); Ira P. Rothken, Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration: A Due Pro-
cess Analysis, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 387, 404 (1991) (opposing punitive
awards in arbitration because arbitrators are not restrained by the rigor of due pro-
cess). Some even object to punitive damages in civil litigation. A vehement denunci-
ation of punitive damages appears in a century-old New Hampshire case. "The idea
[of punitive damages] is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and un-
healthy escrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law." Fay v. Parker,
53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873). See also, Murphy v. Hobbes, 5 P. 119, 121 (Colo. 1884)
(objecting to punitive damages because such relief obscures the distinction between
criminal law and civil law and fails to afford procedural safeguards guaranteed in
criminal prosecutions); Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: I, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 753, 757 (1943) (referring to Blackstone's distinctions between crimi-




party to physical punishment or slavery. Moreover, contract law
will not condone agreements induced by fraud, duress or other un-
conscionable means. Any limitation on the scope of arbitral issues
beyond that point is excessive because it intrudes upon the unique
benefits of the arbitration agreement: promoting autonomy and co-
operation, while limiting governmental adjudicative power over
civil disputes.
When analyzed under this model, the Garrity argument loses
persuasiveness. 173 Garrity stands on the assumption that the gov-
ernment's monopolistic power to impose punishment strips arbitra-
tors of the authority to award punitive damages. The ubiquitous
hand of the state reaches into the arbitral hearing room and re-
claims its rightful position as the exclusive agent of punishment.
Any state policy to increase or even to maintain governmental
power in the field of dispute resolution, however, contradicts the
social policies supporting arbitration. The core of arbitral policy
should be limiting, not perpetuating, governmental power. 74
If awarding punitive damages in arbitration wrenched jurisdic-
tion from the criminal courts, one might accept the Garrity ration-
ale and weigh the benefits of the rule against the damage that the
rule would cause to arbitration policy. Punitive damages, however,
have never resided in the province of criminal law; rather, such
damages have always been a civil remedy. 115 Though the law dif-
173. Commentators have criticized Garrity on numerous grounds. See, e.g.,
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953, 959 (1986) (excoriating Garrity as "an anomaly,
frustrating the goals of fairness and finality that are the essence of arbitration and
undermining the valuable role that punitive damages play in deterring fraudulent or
malicious conduct"); Richard P. Hackett, Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: A
Search for A Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 300 (1978) (predicting that the
inflexibility of the Garrity rule will ultimately aggravate the inefficiencies the rule
attempted to resolve).
174. One commentator suggests that the historical prevalence of arbitration, which
has for centuries imposed punishment, refutes the proposition that punishment is an
exclusive function of the state. See Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:
Contracting out of Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State
Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 563 (1994). Regardless of whether the state holds a
monopoly over the power to punish, the question is whether the state should, for
public policy reasons, wield the power to impose punitive relief to the exclusion of
arbitrators. The social policy supporting arbitration rejects reserving such power to
the state.
175. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1973) (recognizing that
punitive damages "are private fines levied by civil juries"); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The
Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269,
273 (1983) (defining punitive damages as penalties imposed by civil judgment to pun-
ish and deter wrongdoers).
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fers from state to state, civil juries throughout the country award
punitive relief in appropriate tort cases. 176 Some states require
reckless disregard for the welfare of others, while others require
willful misconduct or even malice. 77 Many states permit punitive
awards for strict products liability torts where the defendant
showed reckless disregard for the safety of customers and the pub-
lic. 178 Nearly all the states, however, recognize punitive damages
as a tort remedy. 179 Since arbitration substitutes for civil litigation,
remedies available in court should be available to arbitrators. 180
Constricting the scope of arbitral remedies would cede power to
the state and diminish one of the principal functions of arbitration
- the limitation of governmental adjudicative power over civil
disputes.
Judge Breitel supported his public policy argument against arbi-
tral punitive awards by pointing out in Garrity that arbitration is
"manipulatable by the party in a superior bargaining position.' 181
One party may force the other into the agreement, and the
stronger party may corrupt the process. Such abuse undoubtedly
occurs, but the proper response is to invalidate unconscionable ar-
bitration agreements, not to impose blanket restrictions on all arbi-
tration agreements, even those not tainted with impropriety.
Finally, the narrow standard of judicial review of arbitration
awards concerned Judge Breitel. 82 Excessive and unsupportable
awards might elude correction. 18 3 Although awards are sometimes
unjust, the remedy, again, is not to deny parties their freedom of
176. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text (discussing the current state law
of punitive damages).
177. See GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 171, § 5.01, at 3-8 (summarizing the
standards in each state for the imposition of punitive damages).
178. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 170, at 528 (pointing out that most
states permit punitive awards in strict products liability cases for reckless or outra-
geous conduct, a standard which borders on intentional tort); GHIARDI & KIRCHNER,
supra, note 171, at 6-12 to 6-13 (commenting that, although punitive damages, which
are based on willful misconduct, seem inapplicable in strict products liability cases,
most courts allow the imposition of punitive damages in such cases).
179. See GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 170, Table 4-1, at 48-52 (showing the
positions that all the fifty states take on the availability of punitive damages as a civil
remedy).
180. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Betrayal, of McMahon, 24 FORDHAM URn.
L.J. 221, 229 (1997) (arguing that arbitrators should have authority to award all the
relief that civil courts may grant).
181. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 358.
182. See id. at 358 (fearing that if arbitrators were permitted to award punitive
damages, arbitration would degenerate into "a trap for the unwary given the emi-
nently desirable freedom from judicial overview of law and facts").
183. See id.
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contract, but rather to adjust the scope of review to comport with
the intent of the parties. 184
If an agreement implies judicial review for legal error, the court
may correct such error and avoid unjust awards. 18 5 An arbitration
agreement implies judicial review when the complainant brings
particular statutory claims to arbitration or when the parties have
included a choice-of-law clause in the agreement. In either case,
they have instructed the arbitrator to apply particular substantive
law, and should the arbitrator fail to do so correctly, the court may,
on appropriate motion, vacate the award.
If the parties, without adopting a choice-of-law clause, arbitrate
a claim ordinarily classified as a common law cause of action, the
arbitrator, under customary arbitration practice, may rely on his
own sense of justice. In such a case, the court may not review an
award for substantive error, because the arbitrator, not bound by
substantive law, has not erred by using his discretion rather than
any particular legal principles. Arbitrators, however, never have
license to abdicate reason. An award of one million dollars for the
simple breach of a contract causing no loss whatsoever, is subject
to vacatur on the ground that the award is unreasonable.186 A
party would not, and could not as a matter of public policy, subject
itself to the caprices of renegade or irrational arbitrators. Under
this approach to review, the judiciary intervenes only to the extent
184. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review of
arbitral awards).
185. See Davis, Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 123-29 (discussing the scope of
judicial review implied in arbitration agreements).
186. Many courts apply the test of rationality to review arbitration awards. See,
e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991)
(confirming rationally supported arbitration award); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914
F.2d 6, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying the standard of rationality to test arbitration
award); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988)
(following rationality test to review arbitration award); French v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (confirming award not
evidencing "complete irrationality"); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d
1125, 1134-35 (3d Cir. 1972) (vacating irrational award); Clemons v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 62, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (remanding case to arbitrators for
explanation of how damages were calculated); McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v.
Gross, 699 F. Supp. 55, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (confirming award challenged for factual
conclusions rather than for irrationality), affid, 862 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1988); Sargent v.
Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 922-23 (D.D.C. 1987) (re-
manding case to arbitrators because award showed no support for its conclusions);
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Caporale, 664 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(confirming award not sufficiently irrational to justify vacatur); Lentine v. Fundaro, 29
N.Y.2d 382, 385-86, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421-22 (1972) (adopting
the "completely irrational" standard).
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necessary to effect the contractual intent of the parties, not to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the arbitrators.
Garrity conflicts with the arbitration policy proposed in this Arti-
cle. Garrity, however, does not conflict with the FAA. 87 Congress
passed the Act to overcome the legacy of judicial antipathy toward
arbitration. 188 The FAA did not seek to insure that punitive reme-
dies would be available in arbitration. The House Report on the
bill destined to become the FAA declared that "the purpose of the
bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration
... "189 As the Seventh Circuit has recognized:
We think the policy favoring arbitrability applies with less force
when there are doubts concerning the availability of punitive
remedies - as opposed to the scope of arbitral issues .... Just
as the FAA does not favor or disfavor arbitration under a partic-
ular set of rules, neither does it favor or disfavor any particular
type of remedy.' 90
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,' 91 the
Supreme Court cast doubt on the vitality of Garrity, though it did
not hold that the FAA preempts the Garrity rule. 92 The Mas-
187. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has frequently misinterpreted the congres-
sional policy embodied in the FAA.
188. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the ouster-of-jurisdiction
doctrine).
189. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). The report continues that the
purpose of the bill is to place "[a]n arbitration agreement ... on the same footing as
other contracts, where it belongs." Id.
190. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir.
1994), rev'd, 514 U.S. 52 (1996).
191. 514 U.S. 52 (1996). Even before the Supreme Court decided Mastrobuono,
circuit courts had held predominantly that the FAA's pro-arbitration policy argues in
favor of interpreting arbitration agreements to vest arbitrators with the authority to
award punitive damages. See, e.g., Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 887-88 (8th Cir. 1993)
(sustaining punitive award in securities arbitration); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard
Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1991) (sustaining punitive award in arbi-
tration of fraud claim arising from breach of contract to repair cruise ship); Raytheon
Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1989) (sustaining
punitive award in arbitration of claims arising from breach of exclusive dealership
agreement); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir.
1988) (sustaining punitive award in securities arbitration); Willoughby Roofing &
Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (sustaining
punitive award in arbitration of claims arising from willful breach of construction con-
tract), aff'd per curiam, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985). But see Barbier v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating punitive award in
securities arbitration).
192. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63-64. Universally required in retail securities
account agreements, the arbitration clause in Mastrobuono may have been uncon-
scionable. The Court, however did not address the issue. Even had the Court consid-
ered the issue of unconscionability, it would surely have rejected the
204
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trobuonos, clients of Shearson, entered into a standard-form secur-
ities trading agreement, which contained an arbitration clause and
a choice-of-law clause adopting the law of New York. When the
Mastrobuonos filed a federal action alleging account mismanage-
ment, Shearson moved successfully to compel arbitration before
the NASD.'93 Shearson argued at the arbitration hearing that the
Garrity rule applied by operation of the choice-of-law clause and
that the panel therefore lacked authority to grant punitive relief.194
The panel nevertheless awarded the Mastrobuonos $400,000 in pu-
nitive damages. 95
The Supreme Court had two clear alternatives. It might have
held that the FAA preempts Garrity, although such a holding
would have misconstrued the FAA, which simply makes arbitration
agreements enforceable but does not require the availability of
particular forms of relief such as punitive damages. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, might have correctly applied the FAA
and reversed the punitive award because the arbitration agreement
adopted the Garrity rule. Rejecting both possibilities, the Court
misconstrued the agreement and upheld the award.196 Although
the choice-of-law clause, a term in the parties' agreement, gave ef-
fect to the Garrity rule, the Court would not enforce the clause. 97
The Court reached this dubious conclusion despite the Volt deci-
sion, which had affirmed a stay of arbitration resulting from the
enforcement of a California choice-of-law clause.'98 As Volt held,
federal arbitration policy does not require the application of any
unconscionability argument. Despite the policy of the FAA, the Court grants indul-
gences to arbitration agreements not afforded other contracts. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration policy).
193. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 54. The Mastrobuonos also asserted claims against
the person who managed their account. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. The compensatory award was $159,327. Respondents paid the com-
pensatory award, but moved in district court to vacate the punitive award. See id.
The district court vacated the award and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. See id. Both
courts held that the choice-of-law clause denied the arbitration panel the authority to
award punitive damages. See id. at 54-55.
196. See id. at 55.
197. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468 (1989), the Court enforced a choice-of-law provision which resulted in the stay of
arbitration. Justice Thomas argued in his dissenting opinion in Mastrobuono that Volt
was indistinguishable from Mastrobuono. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64-67 (Thomas, J.
dissenting).
198. 489 U.S. at 475.
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particular rules (and by analogy the availability of any particular
remedies) in arbitration.' 99
The Supreme Court in Mastrobuono rationalized its refusal to
enforce the choice-of-law clause, not by preempting Garrity, but by
engaging in a strained analysis of the parties' agreement. The
Court seized upon an NASD rule, which merely instructs arbitra-
tors to disclose in the arbitration award "the damages and other
relief awarded," extracting from this rule a phantom authorization
for arbitrators to award punitive damages.2z° The Court also relied
upon the Arbitrator's Manual, an unofficial handbook provided to
all NASD arbitrators to familiarize them with the arbitral process.
The NASD does not provide the parties with a copy of the man-
ual.2 1 Although the manual suggests to arbitrators that they may
award punitive damages, the manual was not incorporated, ex-
pressly or impliedly, into the Mastrobuonos' client agreement.20 2
Yet the Court negated the effect of the choice-of-law clause and
held that the parties intended to authorize the panel to award puni-
tive damages.20 3
Embellished with the trappings of contract analysis, the ruling in
Mastrobuono rested on the Court's misperception of the FAA.20 4
The Court announced, as it had in the past, that the FAA favors
199. See id.
200. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52 (1996). Justice Thomas, in a dissenting opinion,
pointed out that this rule, rather than conferring authority on arbitrators to grant any
particular form of relief, merely describes the form of the award. See id. at 68.
201. See id. at 61. The Arbitrator's Manual provides: "The issue of punitive dam-
ages may arise with great frequency in arbitrations. Parties to arbitration are in-
formed that arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a remedy." See
ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 26-27 (1992).
202. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203. The Court invoked the rule of contract construction known as Contra Profer-
entem. See id. at 62. This rule states that if analysis of the entire contract in which an
ambiguous term appears does not reveal the probable meaning of the ambiguous
term, the term should be construed against the party that drafted it. See CORBIN,
supra, note 51, at 262 (stating that Contra Proferentem applies only if the meaning of
the ambiguous term is in doubt "[a]fter applying all of the ordinary processes of inter-
pretation" and "admitt[ing] in evidence ... all the relevant circumstances and com-
munications between the parties"). The Court should not have resorted to this rule of
construction, because the choice-of-law clause resolved any question as to the availa-
bility of punitive relief. See Kenneth R. Davis, Protected Right or Sacred Rite: The
Paradox of Federal Arbitration Policy, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 65, 82 (1995) (discussing
the contrived contract analysis of the Mastrobuono Court).
204. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57. The Court declared that "the FAA's pro-arbitra-
tion policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties."
Id. This curious formulation of arbitration policy suggests that party intent is merely a
secondary concern of federal arbitration policy. Satisfying party intent, however, is
the primary objective of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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the expansive interpretation of arbitration clauses, implicitly aban-
doning contract principles that might limit the scope of arbitrable
205issues. Codified in the FAA, federal policy, however, simply en-
forces arbitration agreements as written.2 °6 The FAA does not
favor the inclusion of particular remedies in arbitration. Though
the Mastrobuono Court purported to apply contract principles, it
distorted those principles to arrive at the desired result - confirma-
tion of the award.2 °v
If the FAA had adopted a broader policy favoring arbitration -
the policy proposed in this Article - the Mastrobuono Court
might have arrived at a more advantageous result and declared
Garrity preempted. Denying parties the right to confer arbitrators
with the authority to award punitive damages, as the Garrity rule
does, forces the machinery of state adjudicative power on the par-
ties, because such a mandatory rule confers on the state the exclu-
sive power to award punitive relief. Such a rule interferes with
self-government, one of the overarching benefits of arbitration
agreements.
Conclusion
The state hungers for power. The business of government is to
get it, use it, and expand it. Contract offers a tool to carve out
private spheres of control, areas beyond the reach of the state. By
contracting, parties establish the rules that govern their economic
relationships. The arbitration agreement is such a tool, wresting
the power to adjudicate civil disputes from the state and conferring
that power on the parties to the agreement. Other forms of alter-
native dispute resolution - negotiation, mediation, and settlement
- are invaluable in resolving disputes, but none carries the unique
benefits of arbitration. If negotiation fails to result in settlement,
205. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63.
206. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Since Mastrobuono, the vitality of the Garrity rule in New
York has come into question. See Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 224
A.D.2d 125, 648 N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (declaring that punitive arbitra-
tion awards are proper unless prohibited expressly in the arbitration agreement). See
Dominic Bencivenga, Securities Arbitration: 'Garrity' Rejected in Punitive Damages
Ruling, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 1996, at 5 (predicting that Garrity will not survive
Mastrobuono).
207. One of the Court's most dubious arguments mischaracterized the choice-of-
law clause "merely as a substitute for the conflict-of-laws analysis" that would other-
wise apply in the event of a contract dispute. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 59. The Court
concluded from this strained assumption that "[i]n such event, there would be nothing
in the contract that could possibly constitute evidence of an intent to exclude punitive
damages claims." Id.
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the dispute goes on. Mediation does not bind the parties. When
the mediator leaves the room, the dispute remains, and unless the
parties settle, a compulsory solution is necessary. Settlement is de-
sirable, but heated disagreements resist compromise.
Arbitration substitutes for litigation; it provides an alternative
forum where an insoluble controversy finds binding resolution. It
is, however, more than a practical alternative to litigation - a time
and money saver. Parties enter pre-dispute agreements anticipat-
ing the possibility of conflict. At this early point, the contractual
interests of both are in harmony and cooperation is easily achieved.
After a dispute has arisen, arbitration reconciles autonomy and co-
operation, though the two seem incompatible in the face of contro-
versy. The common desire for swift and affordable justice
motivates the quarreling parties to agree on a binding method for
resolving their dispute - an adversarial proceeding without exten-
sive state involvement.
The unique feature of arbitration is limited state involvement in
civil adjudication. The state, however, has a substantial role in the
arbitral process. The courts must enforce freely negotiated arbitra-
tion agreements, while refusing to enforce illegal and unconsciona-
ble ones. In addition, the courts must review awards to insure that
arbitrators meet the expectations of the parties. Any other state
involvement is too much.
Although the FAA substantially, if imperfectly, promotes these
policies, the Supreme Court has strayed radically from them. As if
on a see-saw, the Court intervenes too much or too little, rarely
finding the proper balance. The Court once embraced the public
policy defense to arbitration, frustrating the intent of parties to ar-
bitrate claims arising under federal statute. Now the imperial
guard of arbitration refuses to allow the lower courts to monitor
arbitration agreements, even when court intervention is necessary
to effect party intent. When the Supreme Court becomes sensitive
to the social policies that arbitration serves, arbitration will assume
an even more central role in balancing the power of government
with the rights of the individual.
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